RETHINKING THE SOCIAL PROTECTION PARADIGM: SOCIAL POLICY IN AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT.

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ABSTRACT
The experience of sub-Saharan Africa with social development in the period between 1981 and 2005 has been grim, with an additional 176.1 million falling into severe poverty. Over the period, policy attention turned from a wider vision of social policy to narrow social protection concerns, with cash transfer (conditional and non-conditional) as the policy instrument of choice. This is what we refer to as the Social Protection Paradigm (SPP). The paper offers an assessment of the discourse, advocacy, and implementation modalities associated with the paradigm.

The paradigm is the “social” side of the neo-liberal framework, rather than a departure from it. In the African context, it has been driven by aggressive “policy-merchandising” by donors whose funding strategies cover the full range of policymaking: project initiation, implementation, and evaluation. The result is a series of highly compromised claims as to the efficacy of the paradigm’s policy instruments. Nothing in European social policy experiences or their normative underpinnings suggests that the policy instruments should be aggressively merchandised to African countries. The instruments represent a diminution of the development vision that underpinned a variety of successful social policy regimes that combined economic growth and poverty reduction.

We offer an alternative vision of social policy encapsulated in the idea of Transformative Social Policy. Rather than the narrow vision of SPPs, we argue that social policy has multiple roles, including production, re-distribution, protection, reproduction, social cohesion or nation-building. Social policy, in the context of meeting Africa’s development challenges, must embrace these multiple roles. Economic development, underpinned by transformative social policy, must combine growth with the structural transformation of the economy and social relations, underpinned by the norms of equality and social solidarity.

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Introduction

The experience of sub-Saharan Africa with social development in the period between 1981 and 2005 was grim. Using the World Bank’s datum line for severe poverty (US$1.25 in 2005 PPP prices), an additional 176.1 million in the region fell into severe poverty. In the wake of the global crisis, we are confronted with grim predictions. In its 2009 World Development Indicators, the World Bank estimated that an additional 46 million people will fall into severe poverty, and an additional 53 million people will become poor as a result of the economic crisis. It estimated that between 200,000 and 400,000 children will die annually if the crisis persists; that is anything between 1.4 million to 2.8 million new cases of child mortality between 2009 and 2015 (World Bank 2009: 11).

Since the late 1980s, policy attention has focused on social protection instruments to mitigate the impact of adjustment - the so-called “social dimensions of adjustment” issues. In recent years, the focus has turned to cash transfer (conditional and non-conditional) as policy instrument of choice for addressing poverty and “vulnerability”. Much of this is linked to the idea that such a policy option offers a more efficient use of, and a measurable impact of, budget-support instruments. In parallel with this, there has been the effort among international non-governmental and multilateral organisations to call for internal fiscal instruments to raise the funds for such social protection mechanisms. The argument that between 0.5% and 2.7% of national GDP would be enough to fund such cash transfers, focused on old persons, and would seem to suggest that the absence of such instruments as child support grants, family cash transfers or old age pension schemes is largely due to a lack of political will. The economic argument, i.e., the affordability case, it seems, has been made. These ideas of social protection involve a retreat into a narrow, diminutive vision of social policy.

The conditional cash transfer scheme, for instance, has been celebrated as being “as close as one can come to a magic bullet in development” (Birdsall 2004). With the objective, inter alia, to “correct for market failures associated with non-internalized positive externalities”, conditional cash transfer programmes have sought “to create incentives for individuals to adjust their behaviour towards matching the social optimum” (Janvry & Sadoulet 2004). Cash transfers generally have been enthused across the “donor” community as the policy instrument of choice: they are market-compliant, efficient in resource allocation and targeting, and suited to budget support programmes (see Dani 2008, Holmqvist 2009). In Southern Africa, the cash transfer scheme, as a major instrument of social protection intervention, has been widely celebrated (Case et al 2005, Samson et. al 2004, 2005, Samson 2008, Schubert 2004, and Wilman et al 2007). What is more, social protection instruments such as conditional cash transfer schemes would seem to have reversed the traditional direction of the flow of ideas and policy-learning, with the global North taking its policy lessons from the global South.

There is, of course, much more to the Social Protection Paradigm than the cash transfer scheme. The World Bank (2001a, 2001b) can point to its array of works on “multi-pillar” pension reforms, health insurance, or labour market “reforms”, as examples of a “wider understanding” of social protection. Those proposing the transformative social protection discourse will argue that the framework goes beyond resource transfer, safety-nets or other aspects of the Bank’s risk-management framework. The remit of transformative social protection involves not only ex-ante mitigation of vulnerability but also the discriminatory legal and social practices that produce or exacerbate vulnerability (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004, 2007). Agencies in the field could equally argue that their social protection works include non-cash resource transfers.

The “social protection agenda” as Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2007:1) note, “comes with a fresh array of conceptual frameworks, analytical tools, empirical evidence,
national policy processes, heavyweight agencies and big names in development studies aligned behind it”. Much of this, we will demonstrate is due to aggressive policy-merchandising by donor agencies (multilateral and bilateral), non-governmental organisations, and an army of consultants. International non-governmental organisations (INGOs), associated with social justice concerns in areas such as the protection of children and old persons, have found common cause with organisations associated with enforcing the neo-liberal economic and social policies that laid much of Africa prostrate in the first instance, even as the latter declared that it had moved into a “post-Washington Consensus” phase. The near-hegemonic position of social protection as the preferred policy instrument of choice for addressing the scourge of poverty and mind-numbing destitution is such that to argue against it must be either an act of madness or worse.

Underlying the “Social Protection Paradigm” is a set of problematic assumptions, norms, and policy practices. First, is the problematic nature of policy transfers and learning. Devereux et al (2010) have pointed to what seems to be the “resistance” among several African governments to the scaling up of the existing donor-driven “pilot schemes” or to adopting such schemes. The persistent arguments of the international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) in this regard, we argue, miss the point. Second, is the disconnection of social and economic policy, the almost universal focus on chronic poverty (the “ultra-poor”) and vulnerability, and a preference for means-testing and targeting. The INGO segment of the paradigm that claims to be animated by “social justice” is nonetheless wedded to a language of re-distribution that violates both the normative underpinnings of progressive social-policy thinking in Europe, and the solidaristic norms of the communities in which the “social protection” schemes are being implemented. The dominant discourse results in a problematic treatment of the poor as a demographic category: largely unproductive, destitute, and in need of handouts; it inadvertently sets the poorest against the poor. It is a vision of society that is far from the successful “encompassing” vision of mainstream society which builds on altruism, social cohesion, and equality. Furthermore, in much of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the proportion of the working poor within the total employment remains quite high (World Bank 2009).

Third, the normative underpinning of the social protection paradigm is wedded to the prevailing economic paradigm infused with market transactional logic. The economic paradigm is largely unchallenged and its role in explaining the vulnerability, which the social protection practitioners seek to mitigate, remains, for the most part, uninvestigated. The result is the diminution of the vision of social policy that frames the successful examples of the capacity to combine economic growth with inclusivity. Successful cases, we argue, are grounded in the norms of equality and solidarity.

The alternative model for meeting the challenge of inclusive development in Africa requires a fundamental departure from the prevailing Social Protection paradigm and a return to a wider vision of society that embeds social policy with a wider development strategy. Rather than the mono-tasking of social policy (protection for destitution), social policy performs multiple functions: production, protection, re-distribution, reproduction, and social cohesion or nation-building.

For the purpose of our analysis in this paper, we define social policy as the “collective public efforts aimed at affecting and protecting the social well-being of people within a given territory” (Adesina 2009:38). The definition self-consciously avoids the statist orientation of the dominant trend in the field. There is more to social policy than what the state does; nonetheless, it is concerned with collective public efforts. Similarly, social policy goes beyond “guaranteeing a minimum level of social well-being through social insurance, unemployment insurance, old-age pension, or pro-natalist social provisioning” (Adesina 2009:38); it includes publicly-mediated or guaranteed access to education, healthcare, employment, housing, and so on. Economic policy, on the other hand, refers to public efforts directed at the functioning of the economy through the use of fiscal and monetary instruments. While distinct, social and economic policies overlap, and
one impacts upon the other. Fiscal policies can be used as levers of social policy; state social spending involves budgetary allocation, a fiscal instrument. Similarly, social policies serve as levers for economic policy outcomes: labour productivity, economic growth, etc.

**Social Protection: Mapping the Paradigm**

The role of "travelling ideas" in policy advice is widely-acknowledged; Garba (2007) referred to an important dimension of such ideas as "sovereign rentier capitalism" (SRC). More than a benign exchange of ideas among intellectuals and policy-makers, and a mechanism for policy-learning, "sovereign rentier capitalism", as Garba (2007) and Toye (1991) argue, has the distinct objective of seizing and retaining the control of the policy-making instruments; it functions like intangible usury capital. In its compelling context, SRC undermines policy-learning and generates policy atrophy in the host local context, distorting local realities and the prospects for long-term sustainable development. Each phase which Garba (2007) identified involved distinct and dominant “large ideas”. This paper identifies the Social Protection Paradigm as such an instance of a "large idea". The UK Department for International Development (DfID) has devoted considerable energy and resources to pushing its policy agenda on "social transfers" as the preferred policy instrument (see Hickey et al., 2008). The World Bank has devoted considerable efforts and resources, as well, to merchandising its "social risk management" framework (see Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). With aid sometimes being made conditional on the adoption of the particular donor’s policy-instrument of choice, this is not a domain of benign policy influence-wielding or merchandising. With other “donor” agencies committed to the same policy-line, and funding or running pilot projects of one kind or another, public policy-makers can find themselves in a cold-place when arguing the case against the prevailing social protection discourse. If there is one lesson from the past 35 years for many African countries, it is that “donor harmonisation” all too often becomes a policy pincer-attack; a "Trappers’ Game" (Adesina 2003, 2006; Hickey et al., 2008:8).

**Social Protection Discourses: unity in diversity**

The march of the Social Protection paradigm has, indeed, been long, albeit largely constrained. In this section, we engage with the different manifestations of the social protection discourse and policy regime - from the Bank-led "social dimensions of structural adjustment" framework (see Holzmann et al., 2003) to Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler’s (2004, 2007) idea of "transformative social protection" - and identify the differences and commonalities among the different strands of the discourse.

The Social Dimensions of Adjustment programme was launched in 1987, ostensibly as a multi-agency programme housed in the World Bank. This was in response to the mounting evidence of the severe social cost of the orthodox structural adjustment programme. A series of UNICEF-sponsored studies (see Jolly and Cornia 1984, Cornia et al 1987, Stewart 1991) had demonstrated the severity of the damaging social impact of the structural adjustment programme. Rather than the orthodox neo-liberal policies producing positive social and economic returns for the “poorest” - in whose name the attacks on “rent-seeking” and the perverse incentives of state engagement in economic and social provisioning were launched in the 1970s and the 1980s - the impact of the first decade of structural adjustment was not only economic contraction, but also severe and widespread entitlement failures. The result was a sharp increase in poverty among the old poor and the newly impoverished. The UNICEF studies brought the evidence into the policy mainstream, out of the “fringe complaints” of the “vested-interest groups”, who were supposed to be the losers in the reform process.
The policy response was not so much a fundamental rethink of the policy instrument and the ontological foundations of economic thinking in which structural adjustment was located. The response was for a design of a range of “safety-nets”, poor relief, to address the “social costs” of reform. One defining principle was the strict targeting of those considered to be vulnerable and in dire poverty. I would suggest that this remains a common thread which holds together the different strands of the Social Protection paradigm. One variety of the “safety net” approach suffused the different strands of the dominant response to the rising tide of poverty, which was induced by the neo-liberal policy regime: from Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) programme to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). There was little to demonstrate that the tide of severe impoverishment was turning. Between 1987 and 1998, for instance, an additional 73.7 million people in sub-Saharan Africa fell into poverty, raising the number of those in severe poverty in the region to 290.9 million (Adesina 2006:33).

The recourse to the “Social Risk Management” (SRM) framework (Holzmann and Jørgensen 2000) was supposed to mark a shift in the Bank’s discourse and understanding of vulnerability and its preferred anti-poverty policy instruments. “Social Protection,” Holzmann and Jørgensen (2000:2) announced, “is back on the international agenda.” Behind the SRM lies the idea “that all individuals, households and communities are vulnerable to multiple risks” from diverse sources: environmental and “man-made” - although much of the latter could easily fall into the realm of force majeure. Poverty is understood in terms of vulnerability to these shocks. A good SRM framework is one that “effectively and efficiently handle[s] risk in its various forms” (Holzmann and Jørgensen 2000:6); it would need to reduce vulnerability and smoothen consumption (World Bank 2001a: 9-11). It would combine “labour market interventions, social insurance... and safety nets, under a unifying scheme” (Holzmann and Jørgensen 2000:9). Its result will be to enhance welfare and equity, and promote economic development. The World Bank (2001a:10) claim that there is an interaction (overlap) between SRM, social protection, and re-distribution. We will return to this later. Even so, the SRM framework remains wedded to the traditional safety-net discourse in a number of ways. First, is its definition of the social segment which is the primary focus of policy attention. Beyond helping individuals and households to manage risk better, the core social protection objective here is “to provide support to the critically poor” (Holzmann and Jørgensen 2000:11). Second, is the mechanism for reaching them: strict targeting. While the SRM framework of the World Bank is often presented as a departure from the earlier restrictive focus on safety-nets (Holzmann and Jørgensen 2000, Holzmann and Kozel. 2007), the underlining logic remains the same - a focus on the ultra-poor. It is a position that came across in the volume devoted to sub-Saharan Africa (World 2001b). In addressing the seeming dilemma of Pareto optimality in resource allocation for social protection, the document (World 2001b:20) cited Alderman (2000):

“Consider a transfer program that can allocate 1 percent of gross national product (GNP) to social protection, a figure in keeping with the benchmark advocated to protect the vulnerable in Latin America from the consequences of the economic crises of the late 1980s. If this is transferred equally and without cost to all individuals defined as below the poverty line in Zimbabwe, each of the poor would receive US$0.85 a month, which would provide the recipient with an increase of income less than 5 percent of their average consumption. Using the same 1 percent of GNP, but targeting the ultra-poor would provide a transfer of nearly 11 percent of income for the poorest.”

The Bank proclaimed its dream of a world free of poverty (World 2001a, 2001b) and that the SRM was a move “from safety net to springboard”; this was supposed to be the trampoline!
Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) was a self-declared effort to transcend the SRM and other preceding framing of social protection. Against these, they set their idea of “transformative social protection”. For the authors, social protection covers:

“all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups” (2004:iii, 9).

Their point of departure from earlier conceptions of social protection was at three levels: what they called “problem identification”; “problem prioritisation”; and “social protection providers”. SRM and other framing of social protection suffer from problem identification, in that they are excessively restrictive: a narrow and largely economistic reading of the causes of vulnerability. These “social risks” ranged from domestic violence to civil war (ibid: 4). The difficulty with this approach to problem identification is that it is concerned with low income, living standard, or decline in income and livelihood as a result of vulnerability to external shock. Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler argued that it was important to target both. The issue of providers, they argued, tended to be quite amorphous (public and public action). By contrast they favoured a broader set of providers: private, community, and public (ibid.: 4). The transformative social protection agenda, they argued, was to take us beyond the “deserving poor” focus of earlier ideas of social protection. Rather than expenditure smoothening social protection, they argued, we should go beyond “economic protection” and be truly “social”:

“Other forms of ‘social protection’ would address distinct problems of ‘social vulnerability’, not necessarily through resource transfers, but through delivery of social services, and through measures to modify and regulate behaviour towards socially vulnerable groups.” (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004:9)

Unlike other approaches that are safety net-centric and address vulnerability ex-post, the approach offered by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) was supposed to be concerned with vulnerability ex-ante: it “emerges from a broader conceptualisation of vulnerability than economic risk alone” (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2007:23). Protection from vulnerability requires the structural causative factors that are deeply “embedded in the sociopolitical context” of society to be addressed.

However, this approach shares the fundamental discourse of the wider Social Protection paradigm. First, there is the excessive focus on “the socially vulnerable”. Second, there is a refusal to engage with the neo-liberal economic paradigm as being immanently vulnerability-deepening. Social vulnerability (and its social justice discourse) is restricted to endogenous cultural and inter-subjective practices and regulations. Self-consciously, it locates itself within the “social exclusion” literature (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2007:24).

As is evident from a wider survey of the prevailing discourse, much of the discourse is perched between the old safety-net and SRM discourse and the “transformative social protection”. A survey of the actually, existing policy-orientation demonstrates that, apart from being wedded to those experiencing “chronic poverty” -the most adversely vulnerable - the instrument of choice for reaching the potential recipients is through targeting (cf. Hickey 2008, Devereux and Cipryk 2009, Devereux et al 2010).1 As the actual policy roll out (pilot-schemes, nevertheless) takes place, the preponderance of this very limited (if not limiting) understanding of social protection becomes obvious/clear: chronic poverty, the most vulnerable, and highly ponderous and restrictive targeting mechanisms, largely donor-funded, and driven, with INGOs as service providers at the delivery

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1 See the articles featured in IDS Bulletin 38(3), Debating Social Protection.
point. National institutions may be drawn into implementation, but it is often in a manner that targets lower levels of government departments. The targeted units and their officials, relative to the rest of the civil service, are well-resourced and well-embedded in these donor-driven schemes. The result is the subversion of coherent policy-making and institutional-learning and knowledge-building within the public service. It is not uncommon for different INGOs and donors to be implementing different and fragmented programmes with different units of the same ministry working in different policy silos.

The “near-hegemony” of “social transfer” schemes is partly in response to the problem of aid-fatigue and the need for donors to justify their existence and the use of the resources they administer to their home audience. Social transfer-focused budget support or schemes directly implemented or contracted by the donor-agency would seem to give a new impetus to how to justify additional aid flow in the context of already severe aid-dependency in several cases (see Dani 2008, Holmqvist 2009). The focus on the “recipient countries” has been aggressive policy-merchandising. Of the various bilateral agencies pushing the social protection paradigm, the UK DfID has been self-oriented in being the “lead-donor” in pushing the policy instrument - initially, in a supportive role to the World Bank, but increasingly as the lead agency in securing the hegemony of the paradigm, especially in the African policy space. The agenda has, self-consciously, sought to secure policy influence through:

“The provision of expert technical assistance, the studies that it commissions, the study tours that it facilitates and also through the knowledge that its advisors possess of ST/SP. This capacity has allowed DFID to directly influence debates over ST/SP in ways that has increased the number of beneficiaries who benefit from ST/SP schemes (e.g., Ethiopia) and persuaded government officials to adopt social transfer pilot projects (e.g., Zambia).” (Hickey et al 2008:7).

Along the line, the effort has been to promote a number of the pilot cases (Ethiopia and Zambia, in particular) “as an African success story”. Apparently, doing so is supposed to remove the donor-scent on the schemes. This is an agenda that seems to work more with middle-level officials in line ministries. Hickey et al (2008) and Devereux et al (2010) have recorded how less successful this policy merchandising is with “more powerful political and policy actors”. The captive audience seems to be the “weak policy actors” (Hickey et al 2008:8). Often, the explanation for the failure to penetrate the more powerful policy-makers is presented as an absence of “political will”; policy-makers “who just don’t get it” (to use street parlance) or the imperviousness of finance ministry officials in many of the African countries. The problem with this “explanation” is at three levels. First, is the ideational crisis at the heart of the prevailing social protection discourse. Second, is the nature of the evidence often canvassed in defence of cash transfer-centric social protection. The third concerns the failure of the development reasoning that underpins the paradigm. We now turn to these three problems in the Social Protection paradigm.

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2 This targeting of “weak” actors on the African landscape is not limited to the field of social policy. DFID’s recent foray into the field of social science research support in Africa involved a self-conscious decision to side-step Africa’s oldest and longest surviving social science research council (CODESRIA)—founded in 1973, with headquarters in Dakar, Senegal and flourishing—and create a competing, new organisation based on the same clientilist approach in which UK researchers and institutions take control of ‘capacity building’ in the field of Africa’s social sciences. The parallel with the effort to impose a particular vision of social policy on African policymakers is instructive. The assumption, it would seem, is that Africa and Africans lack the capacity to think for themselves or do anything on their own.
The Social Protection Paradigm: a critique

In many ways, the Social Protection paradigm reflects the ideational crisis at the heart of the dominant international multilateral, bilateral or “development community” in the wake of the seeming hegemonic power of neo-liberal orthodoxy and how to respond to the existential crisis it triggered (Adesina 2010). Three main features define the dominant framing of the social protection discourse. First, as noted above, is the focus on the ultra-poor and the “most vulnerable”. Second, is the preference for means-testing and targeting in reaching its preferred beneficiaries. Third, is the disconnection between the “social” and the broader economic aspects of development policy-making. The “social” almost invariably functions as the flip-side of the “economic” in the broader neo-liberal discourse. The focus on chronic poverty has often involved a superficial consideration, if not a benign neglect, of the issues of inequality. All these come from the classical Poor Law mores and its resurrection in neo-liberal thinking, largely because of its prevalence in the US public discourse of welfare. However, high levels of inequality - such as those we have witnessed both globally and within sub-Saharan African countries specifically - are not only detrimental to the idea of building an inclusive society, they also violate the ethical basis of successful social policy thinking and practice.

Equally significant is that it is the neo-liberal economic regime that is largely responsible for exacerbating intra-national and global inequality and the vulnerability that the paradigm claims that it wishes to fix. Mkandawire (2005) has demonstrated, eloquently, how the policy instruments “mal-adjusted” African economies. It is of interest that it is precisely in this period that the mantra of “pro-poor” growth has been deployed by the same global and local institutions responsible for engineering the subversion of inclusivity. As Titmuss (1964:33) noted nearly half-a-century ago, those who protest against such disparity do not do so “because of envy; they do so because... [such inequalities] are fundamentally immoral”. One might add that such levels of inequality are socially detrimental. In the South African context, it is often amusing to listen to public debate about the scourge of violent crime (from rape to murder and armed robbery) with the absolute failure of the “public intellectuals” to connect the dots - between the violence and the level of socio-economic inequality in the country. The neglect of inequality and the failure to challenge the neo-liberal underpinnings of social vulnerability are part of a residual social protection approach. As Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1987:41) noted:

“A residual model which relies on the market to distribute general welfare and which limits public involvement to only a narrow clientele, will tend to reinforce the social stratification system generated by the market. We would expect that recipients of public welfare will be given a stigmatizing status while the status position of the remaining population mirrors the self-reliant, self-interested individualism that the market ideally promotes.”

This brings us to the question of evidence. Devereux and Cipryk (2009:20) have argued that the evidence in support of the positive impact of cash transfer schemes in Africa “is accumulating rapidly”. Much of the evidence is aimed at influencing policy and scholarly debates and persuading policy-makers to adopt what have largely been donor-funded and INGO-implemented - the mantra of the so-called “evidence-based” policymaking. Impact assessments are funded by the same agency, which has interest in showing the efficacy of the schemes. Often, it is difficult to separate hard data-informed research from consultancy-driven interpretation of data to support a priori assumption that the instrument is efficacious. The result is that the evidence adduced is often thin and suspect. The website, http://www.socialtransfersevidence.org/, seeks to show – case-evidence that social transfer works. Highlighted findings from the Kalomo Project, for instance, claim that “the ownership of chickens increased by 15% points” among beneficiaries. In another, it is claimed that “asset ownership increased from 4.2 assets at
the baseline to 5.2 at the time of evaluation”. In the case of the South African Child Support Grant, a featured study argued that “7.6% of beneficiaries spent a minimum of one hour in the previous week collecting water, as opposed to 7.3% of non-beneficiaries” and the difference for Africans was 8% for beneficiaries, against 9.5% for non-beneficiaries. How these are supposed to be the basis for persuading policy-makers is difficult to say; that is, apart from the fact that, in the absence of more fundamental information regarding the sampling procedure, a 0.3% or even a 1.5% variation between “experimental” and control group may be statistically meaningless. The increase in chicken ownership is equally problematic.

Underscoring these gesturing to demonstrate the “economic value” or “asset-building” impact of social transfer is a discourse wedded to the neo-liberal framework and the “deserving poor” rationale of initial selection. If chicken ownership did not increase among recipients, would they still be unworthy of the effort to mitigate their poverty? Similarly, the attribution of a 3% increase in school enrolment as evidence that the cash transfer scheme works stretches the imagination of what is the floor of evidence that would be considered appropriate. What is missing is any discussion of the wider social and economic dynamics that reversed the initial post-independent impressive rise in school enrolment in Zambia, and whether cash transfer is a legitimate policy instrument for getting every child of school-age back into the classroom. The “economic” justification for humiliating policy-instruments betrays the lack of commitment, ab initio, to equality and social solidarity.

The pilot cash-transfer scheme in Kalomo, Zambia is a widely-celebrated example (Schubert 2004, Wilman et al 2007). Important as it is for those in desperate need, the depth, coverage, adequacy, and sustainability of such a project should concern anyone interested in a long-term development agenda. The scheme, funded by German Development Assistance agency (GTZ), transferred US$10 per household, monthly. Schubert (2004) reported total household coverage of 1,027 and an average household size of 3.75. This would translate into an average cash transfer of a little under 9 cents per person, per day or 7.45% of the widely-used international threshold for extreme poverty! Although a pilot scheme, the eligibility criteria are quite restrictive. In addition to the restrictive poverty estimation criterion used, we can assume the usual problem of severe under-coverage. The coverage of those considered “food poor” was 20%; it is 33% for those classified as living in “critical poverty”. This claim of success becomes surreal when set against the scale of the national challenges that Zambia faces. Official national data suggests that some 66% of the population live below the national poverty datum line. Twenty-five percent of primary school age-cohort is not in school, rising to 33% for the secondary school age-cohort. Nearly 50% of children under the age of five are stunted; and here we have not mentioned the scourge of HIV/AIDS (Barrientos et al 2005).

Much more problematic, from the point of view of a wider vision of policy-making and meeting Africa’s development challenges, is the nature of the advocacy surrounding the social protection paradigm - often led by single-issue INGOs and bilateral or multilateral organisations. In the argument, affordability is generally taken as a given fact, and the non- adoption of the proposed policy, it is claimed, is the result of absent political will, if not worse. The problem with single-issue focus (and the attendant absence of holistic development engagement) is best demonstrated by two cases. The first concerns one of the more illustrious international multilateral organisations. The other relates to the INGOs involved in advocacy work that concern children or old people.

The first can be illustrated with the ILO’s Decent Work Pilot Programme in Ghana (ILO 2006). While it claims that poverty remains the most pressing single issue in Ghana, and that farmers in Ghana represent by far the most affected group, with infor-

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mal sector operatives coming “a distant second”, nonetheless, the scoping study “came out in favour of a focus on the informal economy because the ILO no longer has a current programme and expertise on rural development... but a comparative advantage over other actors concerning the informal economy.” (ILO 2006: 33). Apparently, if Ghana requires policy advice for the portion of its population that is recognised as being most vulnerable, it would have to ask another organisation, which might have expertise in agrarian issues but not education or infrastructure development. Development issues are rarely so neatly compartmentalised.

The second (relating to the affordability argument) has been repeatedly canvassed by the ILO with regard to a comprehensive social-security agenda. Here, however, we will focus on HelpAge International (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), which has repeatedly argued that a universal old-age pension is affordable, costing no more than 2.7% of the GDP of a country. In June 2010, the working paper produced by Diethier et al (2010) at the World Bank was greeted with elation by a senior official of HelpAge International. While admitting that the cost of implementing a universal old-age pension pegged at no less than USD2.5 per person, per day “is higher for poorer countries where $2.5 makes up a larger proportion of average income” the choice, it would seem, cannot be one of affordability but of political will (Beales 2010). But this was not a new argument. In its earlier incarnation as “safety nets for the very poor”, a similar argument was made (cf. World Bank 2001b:19).

In 2006, citing a report it commissioned (cf. Gorman 2006), HelpAge (2006) had argued that: “a new survey of non-contributory social pension schemes shows that pensions are affordable in low and middle income countries”. Two thirds of the countries covered in the survey had “a social pension” system costing no more than one percent of their GDP, and some 39% of the countries surveyed had a universal social pension. Yet, as Devereux et al (2010) observed, there seems to be considerable difficulties in convincing policy-makers in many African countries to implement a menu of “social protection” instruments - each driven by a particular international NGO, donor agency or by the consultants who generate the “evidence” behind their advocacy efforts. While Devereux et al (2010) were dis-inclined towards a mono-argument blaming absence of “political will”, the overall thrust of their “where to next?” in the social-protection advocacy and policy-merchandising is still about using alternative mechanisms to persuade the policy-makers about what donors argue is in the best interest of their peoples. Interestingly, Devereaux et al (2010) paid scant attention to the comment of a West African official that her government undertakes “social protection” even if they do not give it such label.

Single-issue advocacy faces a much more deep-rooted problem: analytical and policy blinkers regarding why affordability is much more than a simple question of the percentage share of the GDP that a social-policy instrument will cost. In other contexts, the conflation of interest, advocacy and evidence would be immediately understood as a conflict of interest, not in policy-merchandising. Consultants are employed, who themselves have pecuniary interests in delivering “evidence” for the commissioning body, which, itself, needs to justify its continuing funding from a donor organisation, and to produce reports that confirm its raison d’être, which may, itself, be as much about careers and pecuniary issues as it is about commitment to social justice. If this were a discussion of African political institutions and elites the epithet of “neo-patrimonialism” would have featured repeatedly.

The problem with paradigms is not so much that they shift, it is that they serve as blinkers. Those whose raison d’être is about policy singularity, all too often fall into the trap of reducing all policy-making to their advocacy concerns. Advancing the well-being of children and old persons remains a fundamental principle of a policy framework and at the core of a social commitment to solidarity and equality. The problem is that neither equality nor solidarity is central to contemporary social protection advocacy. For instance, when the phrase “universal” is used to define coverage, it actually means tar-
geting (see HelpAge and Save the Children 2004). It is a targeting of the type that requires someone to be identified as indigent, and demonstrate that he or she is one of the “deserving poor”.

While a focused engagement with a policy issue has its values, it does so in the context of (a) its ideational or normative grounding; and (b) its connection with other levers of policy-making or embeddedness within the wider policy remit. The problem is that, in the real world in which African policy-makers operate, like any other, focusing on pulling one policy lever does not (and should not) make sense. To use a well-worn phrase in Development Studies, inter-sectoral linkages and cross-thematic framing are central to policy coherence and positive outcomes. Effective social protection of children and old persons from vulnerability, much less, poverty or destitution, works not in segmented and isolated deployment of policy instrument, but in a wider vision of equality-and solidarity-grounding of economic and social-policy thinking. What the Nordic experience demonstrates is that “the eradication of child poverty yields very positive results indeed, not only in terms of alleviating material hardship in childhood, but also because economic security is a vital precondition for later achievement” (Kangas and Palme 2009:67).

In the context of severe aid-dependence - in which official aid accounts for between 38% (Ghana) and 771% (Liberia) of government expenditure (Figure 1)—it would seem obvious that policy advocates can comprehend the incredulity of a minister of finance or a country’s president who is told all she needs is another two-and-half percent of her country’s GDP to implement a universal pension scheme.

**Figure 1: Net Official Aid as Percentage of Government Expenditure (2008)**

[Source: Financial Times 2 June 2010]

As Figure 1 shows, this environment of chronic aid-dependence was not always the case for African countries. For sub-Saharan Africa, net official aid accounted for less than one percent of government expenditure in 1970, and had been on the decline since 1960. The dramatic rise since the 1980s is not simply a matter of “political will” or profli-
gacy, it is rooted in a new global-policy environment that succeeded in simultaneously eroding the fiscal base of the state, shrinking the productive base of the economies, subverting economic growth, and engineering massive social dislocation, in most cases reversing the social development gains of the pre-1980s (Chang and Grabel 2004, Mkandawire 2005, Adesina et al 2006, Adesina 2007). A defining characteristic of the social-protection paradigm is the refusal to engage challenge the economic instruments and philosophy that generated the very crisis that it claims it wishes to fix. The ide-
ctional narrowing of vision (Adesina 2010) is grounded in this aversion, as are the policy instruments of choice, the focus on “extreme” vulnerability, targeting, and the discon-
necting of social policy and economic policy. The persistent effort to show that social-policy instruments can contribute to growth or activate economic activities, without confronting the market-transactional logic of neo-liberalism, reflects the ideational concession to neo-liberalism not its negation.

**Figure 2: Net Official Aid Flow (% of GNI and per capita US$) 1960-2006**

If we cannot show evidence that universal child or old-age allowance contributes to “asset-building” or improved school enrolment, or a 15% increase in chicken ownership, would we argue that eradicating child or old-age poverty was not a deserving moral imperative of society? How to achieve this may be a different story.

In the context of aid-dependence, the erosion of the economic base of the countries, and massive impoverishment (Adesina 2006, 2007), arguments of affordability promoted by INGOs and advocacy bodies miss the point concerning the levers of effective poverty-reduction. Two-and-half percent of the GDP, in the context of economic contraction and negative current account balance is not simply a matter of political will; it is about finding a sustainable financing instrument to deliver social objectives. Focusing on re-distribution with little engagement with the growth-side is neither good policy-making nor good advocacy. Often, the contemporary social protection discourse assumes that to speak of “re-distribution” is, ab initio, progressive; it is not! We will pursue this line of argument in the next section. While re-distribution (even those that do not make stigma a criterion of benefit) may work in a context in which poverty is transient or the burden of 5 to 10 percent of the population, societies in which 50% or more are poor have to make raising the productive capacity of society a priority in their anti-poverty strategy (Adesina 2006, 2007, 2009).

As noted above, even when some of the INGOs speak of “universal” coverage, they mean targeting: “universal” coverage for those defined as vulnerable (and chronically poor), old persons or children in severe poverty. The claims to re-distribution is a peculiar one, but one with a long history. It is a discourse that not only misses the wider vision of the Beveridge-Titmuss conception of Social Policy, but is, actually, its negation: a subversion of altruism and the norms of solidarity. As Titmuss (1965:15) noted, it is re-distributive alright, but “the stigmata of the poor law test, moral judgments by people about other people and their behaviour, were a condition of redistribution”. In several of
the cases, the contractors and, in many cases, the donor, and international NGO officials themselves, took on the roles of what Titmuss referred to as "public assistance relieving officers".

The extent to which these might be an affront to the social norms of the solidarity of the communities that these social protection regimes are supposed to "help" was gleaned by Devereux et al (2010), albeit without much introspection. As they noted, "it is not uncommon for direct recipients to share their transfers within communities, reflecting a preference for wider distribution than is stipulated by targeting criteria - even at the cost of lower benefits to themselves" (Devereux et al 2010:5). Rather than understand this as a fundamentally different way in which these communities function - grounded in the norms of solidarity - such altruism is often considered a hindrance to the efficiency of the instruments! In other words, the norms of equality and solidarity that we place at the heart of a return to a wider vision of social policy are central to how many of the communities function. That the "development community" is doing fundamental harm to such norms of altruism and solidarity is hardly a matter of introspection. Significantly, as Titmuss (1965:15) notes, targeting instruments function "by operating punitive tests of discrimination; by strengthening conceptions of approved and disapproved dependencies; and by a damaging assault on the recipients of welfare in terms of their sense of self-respect and self-determination". The same INGO officials and contractors who claim to be driven by the norm of social justice are the Twenty-first century’s "public assistance relieving officers" in Africa, even though their own countries repudiated such a method decades ago.

Equally significant, from the policy side, is that the most effective social-protection mechanisms in a developing economy must combine economic development (growth with structural transformation of the economy) with vast improvements in social and political development outcomes. The most powerful instruments in achieving protection against economic shocks do not start off as "social protection" instruments. Attention to education, as a key instrument in a social policy regime that delivers long-term "social protection", is one of the more obvious gaps in the Welfare State and Social Protection paradigm. The focus on education (see Esping-Andersen 2005) and debate around "labour market activation" arose in the context of the skill demands of what became known as "the knowledge economy". Here, labour market activation programmes, in particular, youth re-training, are more evidence of the failure of the dedicated attention to education as a central social-policy instrument with a direct link with economic growth. As Kangas and Palme (2009:66) noted:

“Currently policy fashion advocates activation, retraining, and life-long learning as a way to combat entrapment [in low-pay, dead-end jobs], but these programs are ineffective unless participants already have strong cognitive and motivational abilities. Mobility is only a realistic possibility for those who already possess skills from youth.”  

In the first two decades of post-independence Africa, universal, publicly-funded education and health-care provisioning were the most effective social-policy instruments that simultaneously met the objectives of growth and social protection (Adesina 2007, 2009). A lesson that contemporary African policy-makers can learn from the policy-pioneers of the late 1950s and the 1960s about the public investment in education, broadly, rather than “basic education” is the positive “inter-sectoral” linkages between public expenditure in education and economic growth. The idea that what Africa needs is the lowest common denominator of basic education (as prescribed within the Millennium Development Goals) is not only contrary to the lesson of history, but also makes little policy-sense precisely at the moment in human history when high-cognitive skills and education have become central to the functioning of an economy and global competitiveness.
Similarly, production support for farmers, co-operatives for resource-pooling, price-stabilising instruments were vital in order to guarantee rural livelihoods and to generate the social funds that played the same role that the pension funds did in Finland (Kangas 2006): infrastructure development and industrial development (Adesina 2008). Malawi’s agriculture turn-around is a useful lesson in the multi-tasking of social policy. As Sapkota (2007) noted:

“Malawi utilized a $60 million policy of state subsidies for agriculture to become a net grain exporter... [transforming] itself from a ward of the international community into one of the most successful agricultural economies in southern Africa... Starting in 2004, it launched the nationwide Agricultural Inputs Subsidy Program, in which roughly half of Malawi’s small farmers were given coupons to buy fertilizer and seed at a rate far below the market price. Critically, the government focused the program not on the most destitute, but on the poor farmers who at least had some land and the ability to work the plots, thus guaranteeing a return on their investment in the form of more efficient grain output. At the same time, the government invested in training programs, helping farmers learn about new types of irrigation and management to improve their yields. And once the farmers produced, the Malawian government created funds designed to buy a percentage of the maize crop and store it for future emergencies. In this way, the state hoped to ensure that it would never be caught in a famine having to rely upon private traders to supply staple crops.”

These were the medicines that the neo-liberal policy-doctors specifically prohibited. Indeed, in 2001, based upon a report commissioned by the European Union, the IMF had forced the government of Malawi to sell off its grain reserve. Apparently, it was not Pareto-optimal to keep a grain reserve when you could sell it to pay off your debt or “boost” private sector activities in grain merchandising. It left the country vulnerable when the next cycle of drought hit the region (Adesina 2006). “The 2002/03 humanitarian crisis” that Devereux et al (2010) indicated as the trigger for the big-push in the donor-inspired and “development community”-driven emergency relief work and cash-transfer schemes was a result of the policy failure instigated by the same “development community”!

Furthermore, there is no evidence, historically, that framing social protection in poor-centric terms leads to successful policy-outcomes in poverty reduction, much less in poverty eradication. As Korpi and Palme (1998) reminded us, the more we focus on poverty, the less likely we are to be successful in reducing poverty. Making the poor dependent on the generosity of the rich creates a zero-sum outcome; non-universal social provisioning tends to produce resentment among those whose taxes fund the benefits or social grants (cash transfers) to the poor. Services for the poor, as Deacon et al (2005) noted, tend to be poor services. Significantly, in each of the primary European social policy regimes (Beveridgean, Bismarckian, or Nordic) successful outcomes involved combining economic and social policy. Finally, the focus on the expenditure-side in much of the INGO discourse, often to the neglect of the financing side, is historically unprecedented. When not donor-centric in its choice of financing instruments, much of the argument that one or two percentages of the GDP would be enough to guarantee social transfer will deepen aid-dependence and aid-addiction in many African countries: effectively this is what “budget support” means.

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A Return to Wider Vision

A starting-point is the recognition that successful efforts at building socially-inclusive developmental agenda have always depended on visionary agenda setting; second, that social policy has multiple functions. Successful economic and social development efforts derive from visionary agenda-setting that embrace a wide vision of society with a gaze planted on a long-term horizon. While it is true that successful cases depend on the use of “evidence” (scholarly studies, impact assessment, etc.), this is often in the service of the visionary agenda, not the reverse. Indeed, for many of these cases, what the “evidence” suggested was that they should not, and could not, do what we now hail them for doing.  

In the most successful cases of social development, economic growth and the transformation of gender relations, the visionary agenda is derived from the norms of equality and social solidarity. They embrace the idea of the “Good Society” or of a “Better Life for All” in the language of African anti-colonial movements and their leaders. The shared vision combines the agency of those previously disadvantaged with the buy-in of other segments of society. The initial coalescing of social forces is sustained by the norms of Encompassing Social Policy (Korpi & Palme 1998), which rest on universal access, supplemented by targeted instruments to protect the vulnerable, inter alia. Thus, the universal coverage not only enhanced social and political commitment, but it also made reforming the system and the recovery from the crisis easier and faster (Kangas and Palme 2005). It is useful to re-iterate that social policy instruments are not about “public goods”, at least not in the Samuelson (1954: 387) sense of the “collective consumption of goods”: “each individual’s consumption of such goods leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good.” Rather they are Social and Economic Commons because they involve the idea of a collective, common good (not ‘goods’). Equity, rather than “non-excludability” or “non-rivalry”, is the determinate condition for access, and access may be structured upon the basis of the gravity of need rather than the presentation of demand.

Addressing poverty, in a wholesome manner, in countries with high poverty levels requires a return to holistic development thinking, with emphasis on inter-sectoral linkages among policy instruments, rather than the fragmentary thinking and single-issue policy-merchandising that currently suffuse the international debate; it requires a return to the wider vision of development and social policy. It is this wider vision that is encapsulated in the idea of Transformative Social Policy (UNRISD 2006, Mkandawire 2007, Adesina 2007).  

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6 In this section, we draw on Adesina (2010).
7 See also, Arjan de Haan’s (2007): Reclaiming Social Policy.
Figure 3 sets out the links between the ideational (normative) grounding of this conception of social policy, its multiple functions and diversity of policy instruments, and the development outcomes that it achieves. Central to our idea of transformative social policy is its grounding in the norms of equality and social solidarity. Universal membership and coverage in provisioning are policy outcomes of such a normative commitment. Equally, social policy framed by these norms serves many functions: production, protection, reproduction, re-distribution, and social cohesion or nation-building. The transformative social-policy instruments range from education to healthcare, agrarian reform, child-care, old-age care, and to fiscal instruments. The development outcomes feed not only social and economic development (growth with structural transformation) but also political development, as well. The outcomes, themselves, go on to re-inforce and deepen the normative framework of the social-policy regime.

It is important to re-iterate the immanent link between social policy and economic policy - which are bound by the shared norms of equality and solidarity. This link between economic and social policy seemed to have disappeared in social-policy discourse until recently. We would argue, however, that this link has always been central to several social-policy regimes: the Bismarckian, the Beveridgean, the Nordic and the Nationalist models. The 1942 Beveridge Report sets out as the second of its three principles, the idea that “social insurance should be treated as one part only of a comprehensive policy of social progress”. Much discussions of Beveridgean model tend to miss the significance of his second report in 1944, which was concerned with “full employment.” As he argued (Beveridge 1944:18):

“The Report which I now present is a sequel to my earlier Report, in that it is concerned with what was named in that Report as one of the assumptions of Social Security: the assumption that employment is maintained, and mass unemployment prevented. But it is more than a sequel. Maintenance of employment is wanted for its own sake and not simply to make a Plan for Social Security work more easily.”
These are two sides of the same coin in vanquishing what Beveridge referred to as the “five giants on the road to re-construction: Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness” (Beveridge 1942). The Bismarckian model was more directly driven by the imperatives of industrialisation, nation-building, and weaning the working class off revolutionary ideas. Similarly, the “Nationalist model” (Adesina 2009) was driven by the assumption that independence was the initial step on the long road to post-colonial re-construction, with the objectives of rapid economic development and the defeat of “the trinity of ignorance, poverty and disease” (Mkandawire 2006). The Nordic model similarly combines economic development and social policy; its capacity to combine production with dignity (“decent work”) was possible because the functioning of the labour market was rooted in same normative framework that bound economic and social policies. The outcomes have been, relatively, low levels of inequality and poverty, and better social development outcomes in health, education and international competitiveness. Finally, as Mkandawire (2007) reminded us, transformative social policy enhances both labour market efficiency and innovation.

Transformative social policy relates not only to the transformation of an economy or protection from destitution, but also to the transformation of social relations, as well. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of gender relations and equality. And here, we can cite the child-care policy instruments that can be derived from this - not simply child grant or benefits. The fundamental difference between the British and Nordic social landscape is in the investment in early child-care support and education in the latter, which is universal in coverage and grounded in the norms of equality and solidarity. The difference in gender profile derives a lot from this: releasing women to enter into the labour market and fostering the dual-earner family model. Similarly, social-policy regimes grounded in solidarity and norms of equality are much better at producing social cohesion and inclusivity.

Finally, social policy for a wider vision of social and economic development agenda-setting is not simply something that “the state does”. The current tendency to define social policy in these terms does not square with the historical roots of social policy in Europe or the diversity of the policy-making bodies, and the financing or provisioning mechanisms. It is more useful to see social policy as multi-faceted, with diverse delivery mechanisms - both within and outside the state. The state-community partnership in setting the social-policy agenda, the delivery, the monitoring, and the fine-tuning is not only about fiscal sustainability in low-income countries, but also about ensuring community buy-in and ownership. This is particularly important in the African context. In building inclusive societies, they also facilitate what Amartya Sen (2009) refers to as “Public Reasoning”. What these call for is a fundamental re-think of how we define and shape the social-policy agenda specifically, and the development agenda more broadly; it has several implications, of which we will highlight only two.

First, is an acknowledgment of the importance of policy space. Successful social-policy regimes are grounded in local histories and the available socio-cultural resources. This applies as much to Finland as it does to Rwanda. It requires coherent national level efforts in building institutional capacity for policy learning. This is not simply a question of “ownership”; effective policy-making requires the nurturing of the cycle of institutional learning and the internalising of such processes. Similarly, this requires local policy-makers to take seriously the wider vision of inter-sectoral synergies that bring about success in any one area. To illustrate with a very simple case: you cannot have effective and universal primary education system without good teachers and authors of textbooks, the infrastructure for book production, etc. These require viable higher-education, and research and development infrastructures. You cannot pursue the objective of universal basic education at the expense of the higher levels of education or a coherent national system of innovation.

Second, successful financing-mechanisms are first local and diverse. They are derived from an acknowledgement of the agency of local peoples. These are not simply about the
state’s capacity to tax, but the collective capacity for resource polling and the building of social funds. This has implications for the current aid debate. The binary discourse of more aid versus “no more aid, please” misses what is significant about the international solidarity aspect of development aid. International development assistance works when it complements, rather than supplants, local efforts and initiatives (national or sub-regional). It does not work in the current environment of aggressive policy-merchandising or the policy-bullying, which has been the experience of many African countries in the last three and half decades.

Conclusion

The ascendance of neo-liberalism might be a classical Gladstonean case of “ideas conspiring with power” but it flourished upon the basis of its claimed superior ability to deliver on better economic performance and enhance human welfare. The result within the first decade of structural adjustment was widespread entitlement failure, increasing inequality, and worsening economic volatility. The responses to this crisis social existence and economic livelihood have either been shaped by the advocates of the neo-liberal economic policy framework or at the expense of a significant concession of the ideational and policy spaces to the ascendant neo-liberalism. The result, either way, has been the narrowing of the vision of development. This, we have argued, is reflected in the scholarship around social development, where the pre-occupation has turned increasingly to “social protection” and “chronic poverty”. Much of the latter is based on the norms of the Poor Law schemes, regardless of protests to the contrary.

In a paradoxical sense, while the global economic crisis triggered by the bursting of the sub-prime lending bubble in the United States is deepening the global social and economic crisis, it nonetheless marked the end, at least at the ideational level, of the neo-liberal triumphalism of the last three decades. Both mark a unique moment to start constructing a new social agenda narrowly and development agenda more widely. We have argued that such an agenda would require a return to the wider vision of development. This would require a return to visionary agenda-setting, anchored on the norms of equality and social solidarity. Transformative Social Policy offers the conceptual tools and the policy parameters for such a return to a wider vision of how we may enhance human capabilities and economic development. Rather than social policy being defined almost exclusively in terms of social protection, transformative social policy calls the multiple objectives of social policy to our attention. Central to the new agenda is girding the economy with the same norms of equality and solidarity.
References


